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The recent moves toward peace in the Middle East make normalized
relations in the area a possibility for the first time in two generations.
Israeli-Palestinian and Israeli-Jordanian peace accords are in place. Syria
and Israel are negotiating an end to hostilities, while other Arab nations
are simultaneously easing their economic boycotts on Israel.1
Peace, however, is far from a reality. In the Islamic world, militant
fundamentalists have waged a bloody campaign to register their opposi-
tion to the normalizing of Arab-Israeli relations, 2 while in Israel, the
Likud party threatens these diplomatic agreements. Recent terrorist at-
tacks have also made the Israeli populace question the viability of peace.'
What role can the study of law play in supporting these fragile peace
agreements? Surprisingly, significant potential. This article will focus on
an unlikely, but highly plausible and important topic in Jewish and Is-
lamic law. The law of usury may serve as a bridge for extending peace
efforts in the Middle East.
Despite the centuries-long histories of both Jews and Muslims as
commercial peoples, the usury laws of the two religions forbid the charg-
ing of interest." Although many Muslims engage in interest-bearing trans-
* B.A., Princeton University, 1992; M.Phil., Cambridge University, 1993; J.D., Yale
Law School, 1996. I would like to thank Khaled Abou EI-Fadl, Saad El-Fishaway, and Mark
Wiedman for their time and advice concerning this article.
1. See, e.g., Elaine Sciolino, Saudis and 5 Other Gulf Nations Will Ease Their Boycott
of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 1994, at Al.
2. See, e.g., Clyde Haberman, Among Israelis, Second Thoughts About Accord With
the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 1994, at Al.
3. Id.
4. With the notable exception that Jews are allowed to charge and pay interest to non-
Jews.
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actions, the Islamic fundamentalists who most oppose the peace process
view the law restrictively5 and have called for the abolition of ribao in
their respective nations. Meanwhile in Israel, the Torah's prohibition on
interest is widely observed, even though it is functionally evaded. A com-
mon cultural and traditional ground exists between Muslims and Jews
through the law of usury.
This convergence of Islamic and Jewish legal traditions can play two
concomitant roles. First, Jews and Muslims share an appreciation of and
expertise in banking under stringent religious conditions. This sensitivity
and experience could lead to substantial profit and economic benefit for
the entire Middle East. Second, the very fact that the Jewish and Islamic
interest laws are so similar suggests that the mutual opposition to charg-
ing interest could be of tremendous symbolic importance. The interest
ban could serve as a reminder to Jews and Muslims that they worship the
same God, and by extension, help support a lasting peace.
This article begins by examining the jurisprudence of usury in the
Islamic and Jewish legal systems in Section II. Section III looks at the
economic potential of a Middle East at peace and the viability of interest-
free banking as a means of fueling this envisioned boom. Section IV dis-
cusses the semeiotics of shared legal meaning. Section V concludes this
article with a suggestion that Israeli banks create substantial opportuni-
ties for equity investment in Israel that will be satisfactory to Muslim
investors.
II. THE JURISPRUDENCE OF USURY IN THE ISLAMIC AND JEWISH LEGAL
SYSTEMS
The Jewish and Islamic laws of usury exhibit numerous similarities.
The majority of authorities in both faiths prohibit the charging or receiv-
ing of interest in any form between co-religionists. Jewish law and a few
Islamic schools, under certain conditions, permit lending at interest under
restricted circumstances. Yet in practice the Jewish prohibition has been
circumvented through heter iska, a mechanism that probably would not
meet with the approval of strict Islamic authorities. Additionally, many
Arab nations openly permit interest or allow transparent ruses that evade
the Islamic standard for riba-free transactions.
A. The Islamic Law of Usury
The starting point for a discussion of the Islamic law of usury is the
Qur'an. It states: "Those that live on Riba (interest) shall rise up before
God like men whom Satan has demented by his touch; for they claim that
Riba is like trading. But God has permitted trading and forbidden
5. Telephone interview with Saad El-Fishaway, Former Senior Advisor for Middle
Eastern Affairs at the World Bank and Professor of Islamic Law at Georgetown University
(Dec. 4, 1994).
6. A Qur'anic term interpreted as interest or usury.
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Riba."7 A total of seven other verses spread throughout the Qur'an ban
riba.8 Additionally, there are several hadith or narrations of the sayings
and behavior of Muhammad that deal with interest. In one, it is reported
that the Prophet "equated the taking and giving of interest to commit-
ting adultery thirty-six times, or being guilty of incest with one's own
mother." Other hadith report Muhammad saying that "People can ex-
change gold for silver, and wheat for barley, in different quantities, but
the transaction must be spot and not forward"1 and "[g]old for gold, sil-
ver for silver . . . whoever pays more or takes more has indulged in
interest."'"
Multiple interpretations of these verses have arisen. 2 One of the
least restrictive, loosely termed "modernist," treats the term riba as refer-
ring only to its standard English meaning of "usury," which is the charg-
ing of excessive interest, and not "interest" itself.' s This analysis ap-
proaches the Qur'anic verses and hadith as permitting interest-bearing
transactions in four cases: 1) when a government is attempting to induce
savings; 2) when financing international trade; 3) when financing invest-
ments that will enhance productivity; and, 4) when debtors are being
punished for not repaying their debts in a timely fashion.' "
Another interpretation of these verses is offered by the Zahiri school.
This approach rejects all forms of qiyas or analogical deduction. 15
Whereas the textual prohibition on interest, stated in relation to goods,
can be extended to govern monetary transactions, the Zahiri limit their
application of the ban on interest to the half-dozen commodities specifi-
cally mentioned in the Qur'an.'8 In this manner, it appears that the Zahiri
approach, which is textualist and normally conservative, allies itself more
7. AHMED ABDEL-FATrAH EL-ASHKER, THE ISLAMIC BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 15 (1987).
8. Alexandra R. Hardie & M. Rabooy, Risk, Piety, and the Islamic Investor, 18 BRIT.




12. Book length debates have taken place on the exact meaning and degree of restric-
tion required. One of the most notable exchanges took place in Egypt in the middle of the
current century between Ibrahim Zaki Badawi and Abd ar-Razzaq as-Sanhuri. Chibli Mal-
lat, The Debate on Riba and Interest in Twentieth Century Jurisprudence, in ISLAMIc LAW
AND FINANCE 79-83 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).
Islamic legal scholars have subdivided the law of usury into riba al-fadl (riba stemming
from an excess of one of the charged countervalues) and riba al-nasi'a (riba due to delay in
completing an exchange). For a good summary of the various Islamic schools' views on the
restrictiveness of these categories, see NABiL A. SALEH, UNLAWFUL GAIN AND LEGITIMATE
PROFIT IN ISLAMIC LAW: Riba, Gharar and Islamic Banking 24-34 (1992).
13. David A. Suratgar, The Impact of Islamic Banking on World Financial and Com-
mercial Relations, 1984 L. & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 1089, 1102 n.31.
14. Id. This fourth exception is the justification generally cited for permitting the use
of credit cards. Only if the card-holder does not meet his deadline will interest be added to
the debt. Khaled Abou EI-Fadl, Lecture at Yale Law School (Nov. 23, 1994).
15. SALEH, supra note 12, at 18.
16. Id.
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with the modernist liberal interpretations of the ban on interest.
Several major Islamic schools share still another view, one that re-
stricts the interest laws to the Islamic world (Dar al-Islam). According to
many Hanafi jurists, who predominate in Egypt, a Muslim may engage in
a ribawi transaction outside of Dar al-Islam with a non-believer. " The
Ja'firi and some Sh'ia also accept this interpretation.18
Yet enough Islamic scholars interpret the Qur'anic verses as prohibit-
ing all forms of interest, regardless of the circumstances, for a plausible
claim to ijma or consensus on the issue to be made."9 The classical stan-
dard for lima, "a universal consensus of the scholars of the Muslim com-
munity as a whole"2 0 at a given period, 21 has clearly not been met. Histor-
ically, however, a claim of ijma has often been trumpeted when "only a
majority consensus had existed within or beyond a particular school.
' '2 It
is relatively safe to say that among fundamentalist scholars, who gener-
ally speak for the rapidly growing number of vociferous, politically active,
and hard-line Muslims most profoundly opposed to peace in the Middle
East,2 ' this lesser standard of ijma exists.
24
This discussion thus concentrates on what will be referred to as the
"fundamentalist" interpretation of riba - i.e. that any interest-bearing
transaction is prohibited under all circumstances - not only because it is
possibly the most commonly held view in the Middle East,2 but because
it is a hardest case scenario. If fundamentalists can be convinced that a
profound legal commonality with Jews exists, it will be comparatively
simple to make the point to moderates. The fundamentalist interpreta-
tion is not the most textualist exegesis of the Qur'an and hadith, this title
belongs to the Zahiris. Rather, the fundamentalists have engaged in ex-
tensive qiyas. Building on centuries of scholarship, they have targeted a
number of illa, or effective causes, for the interest prohibition. The pre-
vention of unfairness and exploitation in financial transactions, 2 limiting
hoarding, the need for either risk or labor to be a part of any invest-
ment, and preventing the destabilization of business planning2s are the
17. Id. at 40-41.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 15. However, a caveat is in order. The definition of riba is so politically
charged at present that one suspects that scholars sympathetic to the fundamentalist move-
ment could be overstating their case. See generally El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
20. MOHAMMAD HASHIM KAMALI, PRINCIPLES OF ISLAMIC JURISPRUDENCE 168 (1991).
21. Id. at 169.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Judith Miller, Faces of Fundamentalism, FOREIGN AFF. 123 (Nov./Dec.
1994).
24. See S.H. AMIN, ISLAMIC BANKING AND FINANCE: THE EXPERIENCE OF IRAN 25 (1986).
25. MALLAT, supra note 12, at 83.
26. Id. at 83.
27. Id. In this sense, Islamic investment is intended to encourage savers to reinvest. A
comparison to the traditionally lower tax rates on capital gains in America is not
inappropriate.
28. M. UMER CHAPRA, TOWARDS A JUST MONETARY SYSTEM 120-121 (1985).
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most commonly invoked illa.2 s As a result, business people have only two
types of financing open to them. They may: 1) borrow funds, so long as
they are free of all interest, or, 2) enter into a partnership agreement."0
The strictest view of interest-free financing excludes any loans calling
for returns in excess of principal. Even adjusting for inflation through
indexing is prohibited. Scholars cite to the following rationale as support
for this prohibition: if indexing were allowed, people would keep their
money in savings accounts rather than investing it productively.8 1 Less
strict approaches justify indexing on the grounds that the investor is not
obtaining any increase in real terms.8 " Such truly interest-free loans are
very rarely available and are generally given only by close friends and
family members.
A far more common action for an Islamic businessman in need of
funds is to enter into either a mudaraba8s or murabaha.M The sine qua
non of mudaraba is the existence of risk. A mudaraba is a limited liabil-
ity partnership in which one or more people provide "a fixed amount of
disposable money capital."8' 5 The party receiving the money, the "agent,"
will have the funds at his disposal for investment. He is then able to in-
vest the capital in the manner he considers most salutary." Should the
agent invest the funds "reasonably," he will have no financial liability.
7
The agent receives a fixed percentage of the profits as compensation. 8
Because the receipt of such fixed percentage return on the principal is
contrary to Islamic principles, only profit-sharing agreements are permit-
ted. Although the Maliki and Shafii schools do not recognize mudaraba
agreements with fixed durations, their position is a minority one. 9 Never-
29. A number of scholars who accept these illa still allow the charging and paying of
interest in cases of necessity or, somewhat more controversially, on the grounds that engag-
ing in interest-bearing transactions may further the public welfare (maslahah mursaleh).
See MALLAT, supra note 12, at 77. Maslahah mursaleh, however, is restricted to actions that
are "proper and harmonious ... with the objectives of the Lawgiver." KAMALI, supra note
20, at 267. Conservative Muslim thinkers refuse to accept that necessity and maslahah mur-
salah can exist in anything but extreme individual circumstances and can never justify a
policy of permitting interest. MALLAT, supra note 12, at 77.
30. See Hardie & Rabooy, supra note 8, at 56.
31. CHAPRA, supra note 28, at 40. However, this reasoning misses the point. Money in
savings accounts is lent out by banks, so it will still be used productively.
32. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 218.
33. Mudaraba is also known as Qirad and Muqaraba. Id. at 76.
34. There are numerous other interest-free devices, such as musharaka and wadia -
but the two mentioned in the text, or variations of them, predominate. Banking Behind the
Veil, THE EcONOMIST, Apr. 4, 1992, at 49.
35. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 76.
36. Id. The degree of freedom is generally restricted in the mudaraba contract itself,
which often will limit the types of goods the agent may buy or the transactions in which he
may engage.
37. Id.
38. The arrangement has certain similarities to the American mutual fund, whose man-
agers are generally paid primarily through percentages of the profits.
39. SALEH, supra note 12, at 140.
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theless, the agreements tend to be relatively short-term since no division
of profits is allowed until the partnership terminates. 0 It is recommended
that the person who receives the mudaraba be a Muslim. However, jurists
also permit non-Muslims who are well versed in Islamic law to receive
funds from Islamic investors.41 The investor thus generally receives re-
turn on his money, but to do so he must take real risk and directly em-
ploy his capital in a business venture.
Banks and financial institutions in the Middle East and elsewhere
provide mudaraba banking by reformulating deposit money as partner-
ship capital. The bank monitors the investment" and generally acts as
the sole partner. The monitoring costs of mudaraba are, as one would
expect, significantly higher than in Western banking because active over-
sight of businesses is required. 3 The potential return on capital in these
relationships is also much greater." Large Islamic banks, which are usu-
ally involved in numerous equity partnerships, tend to pool their
mudaraba investments, returning a percentage proportional to the depos-
itor's capital.
A second'" type of Islamic investment instrument is murabaha, a sale
and buy-back agreement. In a murabaha, someone wishing to obtain a
piece of equipment, raw materials, or fixed asset of any type, will have a
bank or investor purchase the equipment for her and then repay the bank
over a period of time at a cost-plus-profit installment payback that re-
flects the market rate of lending."6 One drawback to murabaha finance is
that it requires banks to deal in commodities, 7 which many lending insti-
tutions are loath to do. Murabaha is primarily distinguished from
mudaraba in that "[w]ith murabaha, Islamic financial institutions are no
longer to share profits or losses, but instead assume the capacity of a clas-
sic financial intermediary.' 48 Although murabaha has occasionally been
criticized as dangerously close to riba, because it both defers sales and
yields a predetermined profit, "it is a universally recognized concept
under Islamic law."'4
40. Id. at 127.
41. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 77. Jewish banks should be able to meet this standard,
especially if they hire an Islamic advisor.
42. CHAPRA, supra note 28, at 165.
43. Abbas Mirakhor, The Progress of Islamic Banking: The Case of Iran and Pakistan,
in ISLAMIC LAW AND FINANCE 95 (Chibli Mallat ed., 1988).
44. Hashi Syedain, Counting on the Quran, MGMT. TODAY, Mar. 1989, at 104. American
leveraged buyout firms, which operate as similar equity investment pools, often return spec-
tacular profits. Most recently, the firm of Forstmann, Little and Co. recorded profits in the
billions of dollars for its investors, a return of several hundred percent. Diana B. Henriques,
Refilling Forstmann's War Chest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1994, at D1.
45. There are several other types of relatively minor Islamic financial instruments. See
generally AMIN, supra note 24, at 34-35.
46. Id. at 33.
47. Id.
48. SALEH, supra note 12, at 117.
49. Id. at 117-118.
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B. The Jewish Law of Usury
"[T]he whole body of Jewish law is believed by the orthodox to be
divine law, and hence to have absolutely and permanently binding
force,""0 according to Israeli Supreme Court Justice Haim H. Cohn. "Jew-
ish monotheism implies . . . the absolute and indefeasible monopoly of
Jewish divine law." 511 The Halacha, the body of Jewish law, is as central
to the existence of a religious Jew as the Shar'iah is to his Islamic
counterpart.
The Halacha, like Islamic law, addresses business and financial issues
in depth. The Talmud5 states that the first question a Jew is asked when
he goes to heaven is: "Did you do business faithfully." 5 For religious
Jews, the manner in which monetary affairs are conducted defines their
relationship to God. Because the law of usury occupies a central position
in Halachic business law, it is integral to the identity of any religious
Jewish businessperson.
The Jewish law of usury derives from a trio of Scriptural verses.
First, Exodus 22:24 reads: "If you lend money to my people, to the poor
who are in your power, do not act toward them as a creditor. Take no
interest from them." Second, Leviticus 25:35-37 states that:
If your brother is poor, and his means fail with you, then you shall
uphold him .... Do not take interest from him nor increase, but fear
your God. Let your brother live with you. Do not lend him money on
interest, or give him food on interest.
Third, Deuteronomy 23:20-21 warns: "You shall not deduct interest from
loans to your countryman, whether in money or food or anything else that
can be deducted as interest. You may deduct interest from loans to for-
eigners, but not from loans. to your countryman."
The Scriptural passages, although stated in less colorful terms than
50. Haim H. Cohn, Secularization of Divine Law, in JEWISH LAW IN ANCIENT AND MOD-
ERN ISRAEL (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
51. Id. at 6.
52. A brief explanation of the textual sources of Jewish law is in order. Jewish law in its
entirety is referred to as Halacha, a term roughly parallel to the Islamic Shar'iah. The Hala-
cha is primarily composed of:
1) the Torah or Pentateuch, the first five books of the Old Testament, which is the written
word of God as revealed through Moses on Mount Sinai. The entire body of Halacha is
derived from the Torah;
2) the Mishnah, the oral code of law, which was written down in the third Christian cen-
tury. Because the Torah "is stated only in general terms [it] required explanation and am-
plification to be applied to daily living." EDWARD ZIPPERSTEIN, BusINESs ETHICS IN JEWISH
LAW 18 (1983). This is the role of the Mishnah;
3) commentaries on the Mishnah known as the Gemara. There are two Gemara, the Babylo-
nian and the Palestinian. The word "Talmud" consists of both the Mishnah and the Ge-
mara; and
4) commentaries on the Talmud. The most important commentaries are those of Rashi,
Maimonides, and Jacob ben Asher. Id. at 17-19.
53. RABBI EZRA BASRI, ETHICS OF BUSINESS FINANCE & CHARITY 1 (1987).
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the relevant Islamic provisions, are clear in their intention. "Because of
the severity of the Torah prohibition against usury, the Rabbis took it
upon themselves, as a precaution, to ban any payment or transaction
which contains either a hint of interest or unearned profit."" The Mish-
nah extended the interest prohibition to sales, barring future delivery
transactions.'5
Other potential loopholes were also closed. Lenders could not live on
the property of borrowers while a loan was outstanding.56 In fact, Jewish
authorities went so far as to forbid a borrower from greeting his creditor
in an unusually effusive manner.' 7 In partnership arrangements, fixed
rates of return are forbidden.' 8 All forms of interest-bearing transactions
are prohibited between Jews."
When dealing with Gentiles, however, none of these restrictions ap-
plies. Jews have been known as moneylenders for centuries.6 0 Yet the
mere fact that this behavior is permitted does not mean that Jews should
lend to other peoples, and especially Muslims, at interest. A number of
Jewish authorities have called for the prohibition of interest-bearing ar-
rangements with Muslims because they worship the same God.61 Once
money is loaned to a Gentile, in contrast, authorities vary as to whether
interest must be charged."2
Lending in any form to Gentiles should be secondary, however, to
providing interest-free funds for Jews. Any loan without interest to a Jew
is a good deed (mitzvot) and an act of loving kindness (chesed).s3 Some
scholars go so far as to link the economic success of immigrant Jews to
the availability of interest-free loans provided by their communities."
There is, however, no restriction on capital partnerships between Jews
and Gentiles.
It is difficult to square the careful attention rabbinical authorities
have devoted to the interest prohibition with the development and gen-
54. ARNOLD COHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO JEWISH CIVIL LAW 211 (1991).
55. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 41.
56. Id.
57. COHEN, supra note 54, at 212.
58. BASRI, supra note 53, at 156.
59. Most authorities forbid indexing, although a few feel that it is something of an
exception as it can lead to illegitimate profit for the borrower. MEIR TAMARI, "WITH ALL
YOUR POSSESSIONS": JEWISH ETHICS AND ECONOMIC LIFE 203 (1987).
60. The Qur'an contains the first non-Jewish reference to Jewish moneylending prac-
tices. Id. at 163. The Qur'anic portrayal of Jews in this regard, while probably accurate
historically, demonstrates the depth of misunderstanding and prejudice between Jews and
Muslims.
61. BASRI, supra note 53, at 179.
62. TAMARI, supra note 59, at 180-81. Maimonides, whose position is a minority one,
felt that if a Jew provides interest-free monies to a gentile, the gentile will simply reloan the
money for profit; he would thus require Jews to lend to gentiles at interest.




eral approval"5 of heter iska as Halacha. 6 This term refers to a form of
partnership agreement designed to circumvent the textual prohibition on
interest in commercial transactions.6" Evidenced in a document known as
a shtar iska, a partnership is ostensibly created in which one person sup-
plies capital and the other supplies labor and investment expertise.6 8 The
person receiving the funds stipulates in the contract that he has previ-
ously been paid for his services.69 If the money is lost through theft or
accident, this loss will be borne, at least in theory, by the lender."0 How-
ever, while this rule is the default, heter iskas can, and almost always do,
contain contractual provisions requiring the borrower to assume responsi-
bility for the funds regardless of what happens to them.7 1 Only if the bor-
rower is negligent will she be responsible for the full amount. If the
money is lost, two witnesses are necessary to prove that the loss was not
an act of negligence. Since heter iska contracts can specify which two
witnesses they will require, the lender usually requires that the two wit-
nesses be people whose testimony will be impossible to obtain. The bor-
rower thus ends up with responsibility for any loss. 73 A false risk has been
created. If a heter iska is carefully drafted, it will function identically to a
loan.7 1 Once the heter iska came into existence, "the prohibition on inter-
est lost all practical significance in business transactions."'
65. Not all authorities permit the heter iska. BASRI, supra note 53, at 167. It is particu-
larly difficult for some scholars to justify heter iska when its use is extended beyond busi-
ness loans whose repayment is contingent on the success of a particular venture. TAMARI,
supra note 59, at 184-185.
66. There are four primary methods through which Halacha is created. They are: 1)
support from the Scriptures; 2) acceptance by majority rule; 3) long acceptance though cus-
tom, usage and practice; and 4) recognition by a respected authority. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra
note 52, at 21. Heter iska, despite only questionably escaping from the textual prohibition
on interest, has become law through a combination of the other three methods.
It is worth noting that once one moves away from the plain meaning of text in inter-
preting scriptures, the same problem - that there are no natural limits on the interpreter
- arises as in constitutional law. For example, Tamari states that in today's world, any
interest-bearing transaction is acceptable since it involves an element of risk. TAMARI, supra
note 59, at 185. The concept of "risk", however, is not mentioned in the scriptural verses but
was read in through the exegeses of later generations as a rationale for the law. Tamari
turns to the notion of risk to eviscerate the plain-meaning of the text.
The reluctance of many Islamic jurists to accept such legal sources as equity (istihsan)
because they could "become a means of circumventing [the Shari'ah's] general principles"
seems well justified by the Jewish experience with heter iska. KAMALI, supra note 20, at 246.
67. Non-commercial loans require other mechanisms. For instance, the heter mechira, a
type of lease/buy back arrangement, is the favored method for structuring a loan for per-
sonal consumption. BASal, supra note 53, at 167.
68. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 44.
69. Id. This stipulation is required by a rabbinic ruling that partnerships in which one
party provides capital and the other labor involve payment to the laborer.
70. COHEN, supra note 54, at 217.
71. Telephone interview with Rabbi Michael Whitman (Dec. 12, 1994).
72. COHEN, supra note 54, at 217.
73. Whitman, supra note 71.
74. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 44.
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Despite the fact that heter iska is not mentioned anywhere in the
Mishnah or Torah, almost all rabbinical authorities now approve of it. It
has been said that heter iskas may make the Torah look "like a jest and
be treated with derision ... [but] the just will walk in them. 75 The justi-
fication for this device stems from a belief that the underlying rationale
for the prohibition is no longer valid. When the Torah was written, Jews
were almost exclusively farmers, and loans were needed by the poor to
buy the lasic necessities of life. Those needing loans were, thus, the least
able to pay interest, whereas the wealthiest, those most likely to loan the
necessary funds, had little need for the additional return. By the Middle
Ages, however, Jews were primarily a commercial people, and these
changed circumstances required the development of heter iska." The
heter iska has become law through long-standing customary acceptance
and consensus, a process akin to the Islamic ijma.7 8
Although heter iskas are generally executed in private banking,
79
which preserves at least the facade of observance and reflects the letter of
the Halacha, they circumvent its spirit. Partially as a result, many ortho-
dox Jews have alienated themselves from the State of Israel due to what
they perceive to be a widespread charging of interest.80 "The State wishes
to be a Jewish state . . . but at the same time it does not know how to
translate its "Judaism" into the language of reality without affecting its
secular nature." ' The establishment of equity investment, interest-free
banking services in Israel, modelled on the equity investment paradigm of
Islamic banks, would demonstrate that the Israeli government was, at
least in one small area, taking a step toward the letter of the religious law.
75. COHEN, supra note 54, at 217 (quoting Terumat Hadeshan, Responsuni 302). De-
spite the transparency of this sort of device, the great Islamic jurist Abu Hanifa approved
use of a similar device known as heyal, literally translated as "tricks." El-Fishaway, supra
note 5.
76. COHEN, supra note 54, at 216. This line of reasoning is highly unsatisfactory to
those who see interest as a form of malum in se. One commentary explains that interest is
prohibited because men should labor for their profits lest they forget that God created the
cosmos and will provide for mankind. BASRI, supra note 53, at 201-02. Other Talmudic
scholars have condemned interest because it is selfish to take from others when there is no
risk for the lender. Id. at 201. Both of these condemnations of interest hold regardless of
how the interest is characterized. The undeniable fact is that heter iska allows Jews to
profit from loaning each other money with virtually no risk and no labor. As Tamari makes
clear, Judaism examines interest as a moral-ethical problem. TAMARI, supra note 59, at 177.
The existence of a dodge or loophole, no matter how ingenious, should not excuse a person
taking advantage of it.
77. COHEN, supra note 54, at 216.
78. The actual justification for heter iska resembles the Islamic concept of maslahah
mursaleh or public interest.
79. "All financial institutions and banks in the State of Israel operate under a heter
iska." TAMARI, supra note 59, at 185.
80. Izhak Englard, The Problem of Jewish Law in a Jewish State, in JEWISH LAW IN
ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 143, 165 (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
81. Izhak Englard, The Relationship Between Religion and State in Israel in JEWISH
LAW IN ANCIENT AND MODERN ISRAEL 168, 169 (Haim H. Cohn ed., 1971).
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It may therefore have a salutary effect on reintegrating previously alien-
ated individuals into the Israeli mainstream.82
More tangibly, many of the Jews in Israel most concerned with obey-
ing the Halacha have aligned themselves against the current Middle-
Eastern peace process. Recognizing that the fundamentalist Muslims,
whom they mistrust so profoundly, are pressing for similar interest-free
banking services in the Arab world will, at the very least, push ultra-reli-
gious Israelis toward a realization that they share some common ground
with their current enemies. The commercial benefits likely to accrue from
the injection of new Arab capital into Israel will create a pragmatic impe-
tus toward discovering this common legal ground.
The numerous shared characteristics of Islamic and Jewish usury
laws are apparent. The major difference between these laws is that Jews
are allowed to lend to non-Jews at interest.8 In a transaction between
religious Jews and religious Muslims, even those Jews who consider Mus-
lims potential co-religionists would feel that the Halachic obligation to
avoid interest is satisfied by simply executing a heter iska when lending
between Jewish and Islamic investors. The Islamic investor will probably
require a stronger guarantee against interest.
C. Will Heter Iska Satisfy the Islamic Usury Law?
Nabil A. Saleh warns against rationalization and flexibility because
"an Islamic banking system has no raison d'etre and no prospect for suc-
cess unless it safeguards the much-heralded legitimacy of its means and
objectives; otherwise the whole system will be perverted and its adherents
betrayed."'" In a similar vein, the immensely influential Ayatollah
Khomeini issued a fatwa forbidding any technical mechanism that would
circumvent the ban on riba.8 5 Fundamentalists are unlikely to approve of
heter iska.
Heter iska, however, may well satisfy the moderate Islamic ap-
proaches to usury, as it enjoys a more theoretical basis than most of the
devices actually in practice in Arab nations, such as simply referring to
interest as "service charges." Second, the very fact that Jews employ a
partnership agreement in modern banking, even if it is hollow, publicizes
the fact that Jews and Muslims have similar usury laws.86 It also serves as
a reminder that Jews and Muslims share the same concern over the fol-
82. Although clearly it would not address the Israeli government's financial practices,
which openly involve dealing in interest-bearing instruments.
83. Another difference is that Jewish charities are permitted to earn interest on their
endowments. COHEN, supra note 54, at 214.
84. SALEH, supra note 12, at 147.
85. AMIN, supra note 24, at 25.
86. The heter iska was developed, at least partially, as a mechanism through which the
Islamic world could trade with the West via Jews. ZIPPERSTEIN, supra note 52, at 11-12.
There is thus something of a history of resourceful Jews looking to the law as a means of
bridging cultural chasms.
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lowing principles: 1) the protection of disadvantaged elements of their re-
spective societies; 2) the moral component of business transactions; 3) the
labor theories of value; and 4) adherence to religious authorities inter-
preting the word of the same God.
D. Interest-Free Banking As It Currently Exists in the Islamic World
Middle Eastern governments employ a variety of methods to evade
the Qur'anic textual ban on interest. Kuwait technically bans ribawi
transactions in its Civil Code of 1980, but also permits the charging and
collecting of interest in Article 102 of the Commercial Code of 1980.87 The
United Arab Emirates' Code of Civil Procedure explicitly allows the
charging of interest.88 Other Middle Eastern nations opt for semantic
ruses. For instance, the "service charges" employed by a number of Arab
nations often identically reflect the interest rates charged by Western
banks. Some Islamic scholars adhere to the rigid view that labels, and not
substance, are controlling. Talib Siraaj Abdus-Shahid, for instance, ex-
plains that "[a] service fee cannot be made into interest and vice versa
simply by stating that the charge in some way corresponds to an interest
rate. If the bank's service is fairly-earned income, it is lawful under
SHARIAH." 8 9 However, the behavior of nations ostensibly observant of the
Shar'iah demonstrates the disingenuousness of this line of reasoning. 0
Saad El-Fishaway, the previous Senior Advisor for Middle Eastern Af-
fairs at the World Bank and Special Advisor to each President of the
Bank from 1974-87, recalls negotiating a $750 million loan for the Saudi
Arabian government in 1974. At first, the Saudi negotiators insisted that
the annual increase on the debt be termed "service fees." However, when
El-Fishaway explained that this terminology would not suffice for pur-
poses of marketing the bonds, the Saudis agreed to reference the annual
increase as interest.
91
Despite this general failure to observe the Islamic prohibition on in-
terest at the governmental level, individual investors in the Middle East
have flocked to Islamic lending institutions in substantial and growing
numbers. As a result, a great deal of capital is likely to flow to whomever
offers the most attractive riba-free banking services in the near future.
87. SALEH, supra note 12, at 7.
88. Id. at 8. However, when commercial issues do manage to reach the Islamic legal
courts of the United Arab Emirates, all interest payments are voided.
89. Talib Siraaj Abdus-Shahid, Interest, Usury and the Islamic Development Bank:
Alternative Non-Interest Financing, 1984 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1095, 1136.
90. Even Iran, probably the most radical of the Islamic nations, allows its state com-
mercial banks to pay "fees on loans" that vary in relation to governmental policies and the
rate of inflation. Iran: Banks Put Up Rates, MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY., June 5, 1992, at
12.
91. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
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III. THE MIDDLE EAST AND A FUTURE PEACE: THE VIABILITY OF
INTEREST-FREE BANKING As A FUEL FOR ECONOMIC BOOM
Peace could bring spectacular profits to the Middle East if Israel and
the Arab nations reformulate their relationship into one of economic sym-
biosis. It is likely that much of this growth will be channeled through
investments acceptable to religious Islamic investors.
A. Can Interest-Free Banking Compete in the Modern World?
The viability of interest-free banking, primarily equity investment
and murabaha banking, is a central issue. If indeed lending and borrow-
ing at interest are integral to the survival of modern banks, lending insti-
tutions in Israel will be loath to offer interest-free financial services."
However, experience in the Muslim world has demonstrated that equity
investment deposits consistently return rates comparable to floating in-
terest rates.
"Advocates of Islamic banking say the 1990s will be the decade when
the industry will break into the commanding heights of Middle East
economies and start to beat upon the doors of global finance."as This
forecast is becoming a reality. Kleinwort Benson, a large international
bank, has realized enviable profits in the short-term Islamic trade finance
market and is now arranging more than $4 billion annually in finance for
Islamic ventures." An executive at the Saudi British Bank claims that,
from a banker's perspective, "[w]ith the exception of Hong Kong, [the
Middle East] is the best place in the world for a banker to be."95
The Economist reports that, "Islamic banking is not merely consis-
tent with capitalism ... but in certain respects may be better suited to it
than western banking."9 It explains that the Islamic belief that "risk be
rewarded only if it leads to productive investment" is likely to help create
greater growth and increased monitoring of borrowers, both areas in
which Western banking could use some lessons.9 7
There have also been failures of a relatively high magnitude, al-
though most of these occurred in the early years of Islamic banking. The
Dar al-Mal al-Islami (DMI) lost $48 million in a short period in 1983-84.98
92. This does not refer to banks merely offering to hold investors' money without any
increased return. Banks would without doubt thrive if their depositors refused to accept
interest. Yet with the exception of a small number of very religious investors of both faiths
willing to lend their money without any sort of increased return as a religious good deed,
depositors would simply avoid institutions refusing to pay interest.
93. MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY., Sept. 25, 1992.
94. Kleinwort Raises $4 Billion Islamic Trade Finance, MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY.,
Sept. 10, 1993, at 6.
95. Preparing for the Service Revolution, MEED MIDDLE E. Bus. WKLY., May 14, 1993,
at 9.
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Further, a disproportionate number of scandals seems to have arisen
through scurrilous behavior in Islamic banks. 9 Other negatives result
from the significantly greater administrative costs of having to document
sales and resales in murabaha00 and oversee joint investors in mudaraba.
Despite these flaws, a sanguine appraisal of the prospects for Islamic
banking seems well merited. The early problems faced in Islamic banks
are best seen as growing pains and necessary failures arising out of
innovation.
For those Islamic investors who do not subscribe to the most radical
interpretation of the textual prohibition on interest, banking at interest
will always be available. In the case of the most religious Islamic inves-
tors, who also happen to be among those most opposed to peace in the
Middle East,1"1 the creation of interest-free banking services in Israel
would present an opportunity for investment, while concurrently laying
the foundation for peace through the overlap between the Islamic and
Jewish laws on usury.
Whether a modern economy can thrive without interest in any form
is a separate question and one that has yet to be answered. 10 The ques-
tion, however, is immaterial to this discussion, which advocates only use
of interest-free banking as a vehicle for Islamic investment in Israel.10s
B. The Extraordinary Economic Potential of the Middle East
Should peace in the Middle East ever become a reality, the potential
for economic growth throughout the region is significant. Israel boasts ex-
pertise in high technology, while its highly trained work force is compen-
sated at less than 50% of the American average. This makes Israeli prod-
ucts noticeably less expensive than their American counterparts.1 " An
even greater potential benefit for the Arab nations lies in their exposure
to Israel's agricultural expertise. Israel's agricultural advances could pro-
vide massive benefits for the entire Middle East with its arid climate. 05
The advantages for Israel in the event of a region-wide peace are
equally enormous. The Jewish State is currently unable to purchase oil
from its neighbor, Saudi Arabia, and the other Arab nations. As a result,
it is forced to satisfy its energy needs on the world market at great ex-
99. See, e.g., id.
100. Syedain, supra note 44.
101. See Miller, supra note 23, at 123, 124; see also El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
102. Although Pakistan may be taking fitful steps in this direction. See Lahore, Paki-
stan; Islam's Interest, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 18, 1992, at 33.
103. There is, of course, potential for reciprocal investment by Israelis in Arab lands,
but this possibility will not be explored in this article because the vast majority of Israeli
investors are satisfied with heter iska.
104. Daniel Lubetzky, Incentives for Peace and Profits: Federal Legislation to En-
courage U.S. Enterprises to Invest in Arab-Israeli Joint Ventures, 1994 MICH. J. INT'L. L.
405, 413.
105. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
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pense. Furthermore, the Arab world represents an immense consumer
market for Israel's manufactured goods and rapidly-growing economy.106
Indeed, the economic advantages likely to accrue to both parties have
been a primary motivation for the initial peace efforts. Articles XI and
XVI of the Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles "address and rec-
ognize the mutual benefit of regional economic cooperation. '"107
Attaining the requisite level of mutual trust needed to realize eco-
nomic benefit will be an immensely difficult task and is still years in the
future.108 Innovative use of law, however, can bolster this process and ac-
celerate its realization. Until now, the role of law in the establishment of
peace has generally been ignored or relegated to unrealistic projects.109
However, a natural and nearly costless option for aiding the nascent
peace while expanding financing in the region already exists as a result of
the usury laws of the Jewish and Muslim peoples.
IV. A SHARED LEGAL MEANING
Shared legal traditions represent profound cultural similarities. Both
practice and theory indicate that overlapping jurisprudences have the po-
tential to bring groups closer together. Israel and its Arab neighbors
should take advantage of this fact, both as a profit-making device and as
a bridge for peace, by making mudaraba and murabaha available to Is-
lamic investors in Israel.
A. Law as a Symbol of Shared Traditions and Values
The study of law can serve as a reminder that Jews and Muslims
worship the same God. Additionally, it provides a mechanism for linking
cultures. Law can, and has, served as a bridge between peoples with over-
lapping legal traditions.
The profound similarity between the Jewish and Islamic approaches
to usury is readily apparent. Some scholars have claimed the Islamic pro-
hibition on usury evolved from the Jewish law. 110 The root of this similar-
106. The Israeli economy grew from $36.7 billion in 1987 to $58.6 billion in 1991.
Lubetzky, supra note 104, at 414.
107. Id. at 410. Annexes III and IV of the Declaration also focus on economic
integration.
108. See, e.g., Haberman, supra note 2.
109. Lubetzky, supra note 104, at 406. Lubetzky, for instance, calls for using United
States trade organizations and tax incentives to encourage Americans to invest in Arab-
Israeli joint ventures. However appealing these proposals may seem, the possibility of seri-
ous American interest in such projects is remote. The overwhelming support of American
voters for smaller government in the last national election coupled with the xenophobia of
Jesse Helms, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is likely to curtail
any expansion of foreign aid programs.
110. Joseph Schacht for one claims that the Quranic law arose directly from the Hala-
cha. He finds evidence for his position in the fact that Jews were money changers in Arab
lands at the time of the Prophet. SALEH, supra note 12, at 14. EI-Fishaway also suggested
that the Islamic law was derivative of its Jewish counterpart. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
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ity is a deeply divisive issue. The Shar'iah and Halacha are both posi-
tively the word of God. Thus, any discussion of one law progenerating the
other immediately evokes a fundamental hostility as it sheds doubt on
the divine origin of the later source, the Qur'an. A potentially unifying
solution to this problem exists in the religious beliefs of the two peoples.
Jews and Muslims both worship the same God."1 ' "(A)ll divinely revealed
laws emanate from one and the same source, namely, Almighty God, and
as such they convey a basic message which is common to them all. In-
deed, the Qur'an itself explains that 'We revealed the Torah in which
there is guidance and light.' "1 2 Similarly, Jewish thinkers have explained
that the Islamic faith is closer to Judaism than is any other religion."1 ' To
Muslims, the Qur'an is the last and definitive text that God delivered to
man:
Islamic tradition teaches that the Torah, New Testament, and the
Qur'an are all derived from the same heavenly source, but that the
Jews and Christians have, over the course of time, distorted the texts
of their respective scriptures, whereas the Muslims have in their pos-
session the pure, unadulterated text. 1"
In principle, therefore, the Torah's commands as written, and there-
fore undistorted, should be applicable to Muslims unless the Qur'an spe-
cifically abrogates them. 5 Perhaps somewhat inconsistently, Islamic ju-
rists have, in practice, generally ruled that the Torah's laws are only
binding on Muslims if the Shar'iah specifically includes them."' But be-
cause the Jewish usury law has received explicit divine approval in the
Qur'an, Allah's approval of the Jewish law is clearly demonstrated.
The fact that Jews and Muslims worship the same God is easily for-
gotten in the anger that separates the two faiths. The shared prohibition
on interest can help to diminish the fear and mistrust that has character-
ized Jewish-Muslim dealings for the last half-century. On every occasion
that an interest-free transaction between Jews and Muslims takes place,
it will remind both parties that in their fundamental spiritual beliefs they
are not as far apart as it may appear.
"The problem [in establishing Arab-Israeli commercial ties] lies in
breaking the negative cycle of mistrust, violence, and instability. ' 1 7 Law
111. Maimonides, for instance, felt that Muslims, unlike Christians, were true monothe-
ists and hence potential Jews. David Novak, The Treatment of Islam and Muslims in the
Legal Writings of Maimonides, in STUDIES IN ISLAMIC AND JUDAIC TRADITIONS 233, 238, 246
(William M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks, eds. 1986).
112. KAMALI, supra note 20, at 229.
113. Novak, supra note 111, at 238, 246.
114. David S. Powers, Reading/Misreading One Another's Scriptures, in STUDIES IN
ISLAMIC AND JUDAIC TRADITIONS 109, 109 (William M. Brinner & Stephen D. Ricks, eds.
1986).
115. KAMALI, supra note 20, at 230.
116. Id.
117. Lubetzky, supra note 104, at 410.
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has tremendous potential to bridge cultural chasms and break this cy-
cle. " s Material examples justifying this assessment abound. For instance,
when European Jews immigrated to the United States in large numbers
around the turn of the century:
[R]abbis and lawyers .. .devised the most persuasive synthesis be-
tween Judaism and Americanism. As they redefined Jewish legitimacy
in American legal terms, they fused Torah and Constitution as the
sacred texts of a Judeo-American legal tradition. 9
Jewish immigrants thus had their transition to the New World eased
through similarities between the Halacha and the Constitution. This pro-
cess continued as Jews became increasingly integrated into American so-
ciety. "The discovery, or invention, of a unitary Judeo-American tradition
of law and justice has enabled Jews to feel genuinely American. ' 20 The
Jewish experience demonstrates that the convergence of two legal tradi-
tions, even if one is secular and the other divine, can have a powerful
acclimating effect. Because the Jewish and Muslim legal systems are both
of divine origin, it should be noticeably easier, at least in areas in which




Abstract studies of the theoretical nature of law provide powerful
support for the claim that legal similarities, especially when divinely
based, reflect profound likenesses, and even cultural bridges, in societies.
Philosophers, recently joined by legal anthropologists, "have been dis-
cussing the nature of law for more than two millennia."'M3 The consensus
is that a law's efficacy is dependent on "a state of equilibrium" which
reflects the values of most people in a given society. 24 Clifford Geertz
118. Although there are clearly limits. As Professor Khaled Abou El-Fadl explains, "le-
gal culture is a subculture." Lecture at Yale Law School (Dec. 15, 1994). Thus, the technical
legal similarities between Jewish and Islamic law per se will only impact on limited seg-
ments of society. However, bankers and investors will also gain exposure to the other cul-
tures' usury law in the ordinary course of affairs.
119. JEROLD S. AUERBACH, RABBIS AND LAWYERS: THE JOURNEY FROM TORAH TO CONSTI-
TUTION xvi-xvii (1990).
120. Id. at 24.
121. The interaction of two divinely-based jurisprudential traditions is likely to provide
little room for maneuver in areas of substantive divergence.
122. Indeed, the limits of the fusion between the Jewish and American legal systems
have arisen from their asymmetrical origins. As Suzanne Last Stone has written:
one cannot fully understand Jewish law without considering the religious framework that
makes Jewish law possible and renders it intelligible to its practitioners .... concepts [such]
as the revelatory nature of Jewish law, the religious qualifications of authoritative interpret-
ers of the law, the veneration of early masters of the tradition, imitatio dei, and divine
accountability.
Suzanne Last Stone, In Pursuit of the Counter-Text: The Turn to the Jewish Legal Model
in Contemporary American Legal Theory, 106 HARV. L. REV. 813, 821 (1993).
123. A.L. Epstein, The Case Method in the Field of Law, in THE CRAFT OF SOCIAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 205 (A.L. Epstein ed., 1979).
124. ELIOT DISMORE CHAPPLE & CARLETON STEVENS COON, PRINCIPLES OF ANTHROPOLOGY
674 (1978).
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expresses a parallel idea. "[M]an is an animal suspended in webs of sig-
nificance he himself has spun."125 The deep similarity between the Jewish
and Islamic laws of usury, a central concept in the economic structure of
two commercial peoples, proves that Jews and Muslims share at least one
significant aspect of their respective volkgeists.
1 2 6
This analysis garners additional strength from the divine origins of
Muslim and Jewish jurisprudence. "[S]acred symbols function to synthe-
size a people's ethos - the tone, character, and quality of their life, its
moral and aesthetic style and mood - and their world view.1 27 What is
true about the convergence of legal norms and meanings is even more
profound when the laws are divine in origin.
Even though Jews have functionally evaded the interest prohibition
through the use of heter iska, and many Muslims similarly ignore the ban
on riba, neither Jews nor Muslims can escape their shared heritage. Fur-
thermore, their respective usury laws demonstrate three commonalities:
1) both groups approach business in a principled way; 2) God plays a
significant role in their respective cultures; and 3) their basic values de-
rive from ancient traditions.
V. CONCLUSION: CREATE INTEREST-FREE BANKING OPPORTUNITIES FOR
ISLAMIC INVESTORS IN ISRAEL
Interest-free financing does not fit easily into standard western con-
cepts of banking. A Governor of the Bank of England has stated that
British banking laws simply were not designed to cover institutions deal-
ing with Islamic financial services. 128 As it currently stands in the Arab
world, riba-free banking "is a minnow in the sea of a global financial sys-
tem based on riba . . .it cannot survive without certain religious com-
promises.... There is no shortage of Islamic money; the problem is find-
ing suitable outlets for it.1
12 9
Israel is well suited to the task of providing financial services with
religious restrictions.1 30 Banks in Israel and even the United States3 1 that
count religious Jews as their clients employ a board of rabbinical advisors
125. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 5 (1973).
126. The writings of the eminent legal anthropologist Leo Pospisil suggest that perhaps
the creation of national boundaries separating (for the most part) Jews and Muslims super-
imposed an artificial and hostile legal level, that of the nation state, on top of the religious
laws of Jews and Muslims, which were not wholly dissimilar. See generally LEOPOLD POSPI-
SIL, ANTHROPOLOGY OF LAW: A COMPARATIvE THEORY 119, 121 (1971) (suggesting theory of
multiple legal levels). Evidence for this theory is found in the relative harmony within which
Jews and Muslims lived under the Ottoman Empire.
127. GEERTZ, supra note 125, at 89.
128. Suratgar, supra note 13, at 1090.
129. Syedain, supra note 44.
130. The potential for interest-free investment in Israel is particularly impressive due
to the general laxity of Arab governments in enforcing the prohibition on riba.
131. The most prominent example is a bank in Baltimore known as the Bank Vaad
Hakashrus. Whitman, supra note 71.
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to approve of all actions and then restructure transactions that fail to
meet Halachic requirements."3 2
The central difficulty in realizing this vision is one of disseminating
knowledge. Despite the geographical proximity of Israel and the Islamic
nations, there is a deep ignorance of Jewish scriptures in the Islamic
world.13 Those who do have some familiarity with Jewish law are un-
likely to be familiar with the extent to which it is observed in Israel.
Heter iska is virtually unknown in the Arab world."" EI-Fishaway ex-
plains: "If they knew in Egypt what was happening in Israel it would
make a big difference. The lack of knowledge is unbelievable considering
the proximity."185 Even though heter iska itself would probably be insuf-
ficient as a means of meeting the strict riba-free standard of Islamic fun-
damentalists, the mere fact that an interest avoidance mechanism exists
could lend credibility to the Israeli government's peace efforts in the eyes
of Muslims.
If the Israeli, Jordanian, and other governments commit themselves
to forging lasting peace in the Middle East, the interest-free commonality
may serve as a small 8 6 step in this direction. Israel's major banks could
establish mudaraba and murabaha accounts. Arab leaders would then be
able to publicize the fact that Jewish law requires that financial transac-
tions between Jews be free of interest, and Israeli banks would advertise
their interest-free products. Especially for the secular Arab govern-
ments,1 37 the Jewish legal system's treatment of interest presents a seren-
dipitous means for squaring these two aims. In this situation, the Arab
governments can demonstrate that d6tente with Israel will not be anti-
thetical to the Shar'iah.
8 s
For hundreds of years, Jews acted as financiers in the Islamic
world.8 9 Shared legal traditions could help to revive major financial and
132. Id.
133. Powers, supra note 114, at 109.
134. El-Fishaway, supra note 5.
135. Id. This cultural ignorance is proving highly resilient. As The New York Times
recently reported, "The Arab world's most famous poet has been expelled from the Arab
Writers' Union for meeting with Israeli intellectuals." Youssef M. Ibrahim, Arabs Bitterly
Split on Cultural Links With Israel, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 7, 1995, at A8.
136. The author fully realizes that the course this article suggests is far from a panacea
and only represents an incremental advance toward peace. Unless joint interest-free invest-
ment is accompanied by far-reaching and sensitive diplomacy, peace will almost surely re-
main elusive.
137. See Kristan L. Peters Hamlin, Note, The Impact of Islamic Revivalism on Con-
tract and Usury Law in Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, 22 TEX. INT'L L.J. 351, 353, 380
(1987).
138. Even some of the most vocal fundamentalists have, on occasion, admitted that
"there is nothing inherently anti-Islamic in peace between a Jewish state and Muslims."
Miller, supra note 23, at 139. According to Hassan Abdallah al-Turabi, a major fundamen-
talist leader, "The first Islamic state itself had a constitutional document between the
prophet and the Jews of Medina." Id. at 139.
139. EL-ASHKER, supra note 7, at 24. Iraqi Jews and Egyptian Copts dominated Islamic
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commercial discourse between Jews and Muslims. Joint Arab-Israeli in-
terest-free investment is likely to be profitable for all involved, as the
combination of Arab capital with Israeli technology could bring tremen-
dous growth to the Middle East. In the process, Islamic fundamentalists
and Israeli hardliners will be exposed to each others' legal traditions.
Their enemies will no longer be faceless infidels, but people with
profound cultural similarities - and maybe, one day, enemies no longer.
commerce since 1453.
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